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Abstract
Background: User fees are a known common barrier to using health services, particularly among the poor. When
fees are present, many facilities have waiver systems for poor patients to exempt them from paying. Targeting
waivers to patients who need them most has been a challenge, especially in fragile states, where relevant data are
limited and trust in institutions is low.
Methods: Community-based targeting of vulnerable households was piloted in Afghanistan and evaluated for its
feasibility, accuracy and effect on care-seeking. Waiver cards were distributed to very poor and female-headed
households in catchment areas of 26 facilities in 10 provinces of Afghanistan in 2005 as one component of a larger
health financing study. Households were nominated by community leaders using general guidelines to support
15% of the poorest members. In most cases, waiver cards were pro-actively distributed to them. Targeting
accuracy, perceptions, as well the cards’ effects on utilization were evaluated in 2007 through household surveys,
health facility data, and in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with facility staff and community leaders.
Results: The waiver system was implemented quickly at all but one facility charging fees. Facility staff and
community leaders reported favorable perceptions of implementation and targeting accuracy.
However, an analysis of the asset index of beneficiaries indicated that although targeting was progressive, signifi-
cant leakage and high levels of under-coverage occurred; 42% of cards were used by people in the wealthiest
three quintiles, and only 19% of people in the poorest quintile received a card. Households with waiver cards
reported higher rates of care-seeking for recent illnesses compared to those without cards (p = 0.02).
Conclusions: Community identification of beneficiaries is feasible in a fragile state. Several recommendations are
discussed to improve targeting accuracy of a waiver card system in the future, in light of this research and other
international experiences.
Background
Ensuring that social services and development programs
are targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable people
is a basic goal for increasing health and human capital,
but one that has challenged governments, development
institutions, and donors for decades. Targeting of bene-
fits and services can be broad, or indirect, for example,
through government spending on certain types of goods
or services that are disproportionately consumed by the
poor, or it can be narrow, whereby certain types of
people, such as the poor, are targeted more directly [1].
Whereas broad targeting avoids the costs of identifying
and verifying who should receive benefits, this approach
can be expensive and may not reach the poorest groups
[1]. Narrow targeting can have its own operational diffi-
culties, reflecting tradeoffs between the advantages of
focusing program benefits on those who need them
most and the political, technical and financial difficulties
of doing so [2]. This paper explores this inherent trade-
off between focused program benefits and targeting dif-
ficulties in the context of a community-identified waiver
card scheme for user fees at primary health care facil-
ities in Afghanistan. * Correspondence: lsteinha@jhsph.edu
Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, Baltimore, USA
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Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott identify three primary
types of narrow targeting: 1) individual/household
assessment, which can include verified means tests (e.g.,
collection of consumption data in low- and middle-
income countries), proxy means tests, or community
identification; 2) categorical targeting, whereby eligibility
is defined by easily observable characteristics such as
age, geography, gender, or other characteristics; and 3)
self-selection, whereby poor households/individuals self-
select to participate in a program whose opportunity
costs (e.g., time) are too high or benefits too low (e.g.,
stigmatized) for wealthier households/individuals to par-
ticipate [3].
Proxy means testing typically uses more easily col-
lected information on household or individual character-
istics, such as assets, housing characteristics, education,
basic needs, food consumption, that correlate relatively
well with welfare levels [2,4]. One challenge with proxy
means tests involves how to score or translate proxy
measures into poverty levels with meaningful cut-offs
for programmatic decisions. Methods that have been
used include simple summation of measures, weighted
summation, with weights and cut-offs developed by
expert consensus or face validity, or weights determined
through a predictive algorithm such as regression on
“gold standards” of poverty, such as per-capita or
adjusted per-capita consumption [2,5]. Principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) on an index of durable assets and
housing construction variables has recently proven use-
ful for identifying relative wealth in a straightforward
manner that appears to reflect underlying wealth levels
relatively well [6]. Per capita or adjusted per capita
expenditure or consumption are still widely considered
the most reliable and valid method for assessing poverty,
and these can provide absolute measures of poverty in
reference to a minimum level of consumption/expendi-
ture required to meet basic needs. Poverty assessments
that use PCA are more useful for measuring relative
poverty or wealth, though it can be argued that this is
an equally relevant concept in development programs
aiming to target the poorest members within a given
community [7].
Community assessment, whereby community mem-
bers or groups are involved in targeting activities, such
as beneficiary identification or monitoring of benefits,
can be applied to all three types of narrow targeting, but
is most commonly used for individual/household assess-
ments, whereby community groups or leaders act as the
welfare agents in determining eligible beneficiaries at
the local level. Potential benefits of community-based
targeting include: lower costs, as expensive door-to-door
surveys can be avoided and local agents typically do not
need to be paid the same as educated bureaucrats;
better information, as local agents may have a better
sense of local poverty/vulnerability; and improved
accountability, as there may be mutually reinforcing
incentives between the local agent and community
members to be honest [8]. The potential disadvantages
of community-based assessment include poor capacity
at local levels, elite capture, reinforcement of current
unequal power structures, and the potential to create or
enhance conflict/division within the community [8]. In
Afghanistan, data at the individual household level on
poverty are not readily available, and determinants of
vulnerability are extremely variable at local levels, mak-
ing it difficult to create standardized proxy means test-
ing for poverty. The country has a rich tradition of
community-based decision-making bodies, and several
recent development programs, such as the National Soli-
darity Program, have attempted to create more repre-
sentative and democratic community councils. In the
Afghan context, community-based targeting may there-
fore be the most feasible way to identify households for
benefits of social programs.
Targeting in health
User fees and other types of cost sharing can decrease
access to health care, particularly for poorer households,
leading to under-utilization of beneficial services such as
immunization [9]. Recognizing this, many countries
have put in place waivers and exemptions for fees.
Exemptions typically apply to certain types of services
(e.g., delivery, tuberculosis treatment) or groups of
patients (e.g., children under 5, pregnant women), and
waivers exempt individual patients (e.g., poor patients)
from fees [10]. Exemptions for certain underused ser-
vices, such as deliveries, have become more common in
recent years [11]. While exemption programs have met
with some success [12], waiver programs have not had
their intended effect. Waiver policies may not be stan-
dardized and tend to be at the discretion of health cen-
ter staff, and inherent difficulties in targeting the poor
in informal settings have rendered even well-intentioned
policies largely ineffective [13-15]. As a result, some
researchers have advocated for geographic targeting (i.e.,
granting waivers to entire geographic areas, based on
their average socioeconomic conditions) over individual
means testing [16], particularly with the advent of pov-
erty mapping techniques allowing for small-area poverty
and inequality statistics through household survey and
census data [17,18].
However, recent pilot studies have provided some evi-
dence that individual waivers through nomination by
community groups can be effective in low-income set-
tings where user fees are charged [19]. Health equity
funds, whereby hospital fees and, in some cases, trans-
portation and food expenses, for the poor are paid by a
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management committees and local representatives/chiefs
in identifying the poor in districts of Cambodia. Lao
PDR has recently begun to pilot health equity funds
based on the experience of Cambodia [20]. Aside from
the relatively recent studies in Cambodia, well documen-
ted experiences of community-based targeting in the
health sector in low-income settings are rare. Recent
studies in Burkina Faso demonstrated the feasibility of
community-based targeting for user fee waivers and free
enrollment in community-based health insurance, but
data validating the targeting effectiveness were not yet
available [21,22]. The study presented in this paper uses
data from Afghanistan to examine the targeting perfor-
mance and effects on healthcare utilization of a commu-
nity-identified waiver scheme in a very low-income,
post-conflict setting. The primary objectives of this
paper are: 1) to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of
community nomination in targeting waiver cards to very
poor and female-headed households; and 2) to evaluate
the effects of waiver cards on utilization of curative care
services.
Methods
Description of waiver card scheme in Afghanistan
As part of a health financing pilot study assessing differ-
ent methods of community payment for health care, a
standardized user fee system was piloted in summer
2005 at 27 facilities in 10 provinces of Afghanistan,
including at six district hospitals, 13 comprehensive
health centers, and eight basic health centers. Relatively
small fees were charged at these pilot facilities for ser-
vices (on average 5.5 Afghanis, equivalent to $0.11 US)
and for any prescribed medications (average of 26% of
the wholesale medication price). The cost of an average
outpatient visit, including drugs, was a modest 11.5
Afghanis, or $0.23 US. Revenues were retained at facil-
ities, and facility staff and community leaders (who
together comprised the user fee committee) decided on
which quality-improving measures (e.g., drugs to prevent
stock-outs, infrastructure improvements, repairs, patient
transportation, etc.) to spend the revenues. About 56%
of the facilities had charged fees prior to participating in
the pilot, but usually only for consultation, not drugs,
and the revenues raised were not used at the facility but
sent back to the regional primary care provider, in most
cases a nongovernmental organization (NGO) con-
tracted to deliver services in a given province. Addi-
tional details of the health financing pilot study are
provided elsewhere [23,24].
Under the user fee pilot, waiver cards were distributed
to very poor and female-headed households in the
catchment areas of facilities implementing user fees. All
members of a household receiving a waiver card were
entitled to receive all services for free at the pilot facil-
ity. Preventive and promotive care, including immuniza-
tion, ante-natal care, deliveries,
post-natal care and family planning, as well as emer-
g e n c yc a r ea n dt u b e r c u l o s i st r e a t m e n t ,w e r ef r e ef o ra l l
patients, including those without waiver cards. Facility
staff and community leaders distributed information
about the new user fees, exempt services, and waiver
card system to community members in various ways
they deemed to be most effective, including information
dissemination at local bazaars, in mosques, at the facility
itself, and through local community health councils.
Facility staff were trained on the waiver card system
and given rough descriptive guidelines on characteristics
of wealth groups, originally developed by experts carry-
i n go u tan a t i o n a lp o v e r t ya n dv u l n e r a b i l i t ys u r v e yi n
2003 [25]. Facility staff and user fee committee members
were instructed to carry out enumeration of all catch-
ment area households, and to work closely with com-
munity representatives (e.g., local village council (shura)
members, Mullahs, and other village representatives) to
have community leaders identify which households met
the criteria for being female-headed or very poor. They
were instructed to follow rough guidelines of 15% elig-
ibility for waiver cards, according to the National Risk
and Vulnerability Assessment, which found that 5-15%
of households in a village are very poor on average [25].
However, the exact eligibility proportions, as well as spe-
cific details of how facilities should carry out the house-
hold enumeration, eligible household identification, and
waiver card distribution, were left to individual facilities,
given the local diversity of socioeconomic context and
community participation and development structures.
Data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assess-
ment survey conducted in 2003 revealed that estimates
of food insecurity in the districts of the pilot health
facilities ranged from 0% to 55.9%, with a mean of
21.8% of households rated as food insecure. Food inse-
curity data for each district were provided to health
facility staff and community leaders.
One of the operational principles of the user fee pilot
that was communicated to facility staff was that no one
should be denied care due to inability to pay. Patients
without waiver cards presenting at facilities who claimed
they were unable to pay the user fees were initially ques-
tioned by the registrar. In these cases, the registrar was
supposed to complete a screening questionnaire to
determine if the patient was very poor and therefore eli-
gible for a waiver card. The screening questionnaire
template was developed by a committee within the
Health Financing Department of the Ministry of Public
Health, which included representatives from NGOs pro-
viding health services in each province. The template
was based on ownership of certain assets, number of
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worked in last six months, and recent income of the
household, criteria that were loosely adapted from
microcredit programs operating in Afghanistan. Facil-
ities were urged to tailor the screening template to their
local catchment areas.
Data collection to evaluate waiver card scheme
As part of a larger evaluation of the health financing pilot
study, a household survey was conducted in spring
2007–approximately one and a half years after pilot
implementation–in the catchment areas of the health
financing pilot facilities, including at 23 user fee pilot
facilities, all in rural areas. Three user fee pilot facilities
could not be surveyed for the evaluation due to poor
security, and a fourth user fee pilot facility had not imple-
mented the waiver card scheme, leaving 23 user fee pilot
facilities that were included in the evaluation. At these
facilities, two villages with greater than 100 households
each and within 90 minutes’ walking distance that had
been randomly selected at baseline in 2004 were re-
surveyed at follow-up, except in a few cases where vil-
lages had to be replaced due to poor security. The catch-
ment areas were targeted for survey because there were
no recent census data available at the time of the survey,
and catchment areas represented households which were
most likely to use the pilot facilities, as distance is inver-
sely related to use of care [26]. Using a random start, up
to 25 households were surveyed by selecting every second
household [27] if they had a woman aged 18 or older
with a child three years or younger, as the larger evalua-
tion intended to measure child immunization rates, for a
total of 50 households across two villages, per pilot facil-
ity. Between 50 and 150 households (mean = 120) in the
catchment areas of user fee facilities were surveyed in
each province, with the variation due to the number of
operational user fee facilities in each province. The
household survey included questions on illness, health
care-seeking behavior, money spent on treatment, per-
ceived quality of care at the pilot facility, knowledge of
and perceptions about the waiver card system, including
ownership of a waiver card, and household socioeco-
nomic characteristics. All survey forms were edited for
completeness and consistency and double-entered into a
database in Kabul.
At follow-up, semi-structured qualitative interviews
were conducted at 14 user fee pilot facilities. These
facilities were purposefully selected to try and include
both “typical” cases as well as more unusual cases (e.g.,
user fee facilities where the implementation process had
been difficult). At each facility, up to three individual
interviews were conducted with facility staff, along with
one focus group interview with community members of
the user fee committee, who were asked to come to the
facility for the focus group, and one individual interview
with a community leader from a surveyed catchment
area village who was not a member of the user fee com-
mittee. Trained interviewers asked respondents about
the waiver card scheme, including the targeting and
card distribution process, among other aspects of the
user fee pilot. Qualitative interviews were not tape-
recorded due to cultural sensitivities but an additional
surveyor took extensive hand-written notes during and
after the interviews. Interviews were translated and then
coded line-by-line in ATLAS.ti [28]. Codes relevant to
the waiver cards were analyzed to identify common and
outlying perceptions of facility staff and community lea-
ders. Finally, quantitative data on the implementation
process of the waiver card system were gathered
through a systematic survey of the facility in-charge at
each user fee facility. Ethical approval for the study was
obtained from the Institutional Review Board of Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in
Baltimore, Maryland, and from the Ethical Review Board
in Kabul, Afghanistan. Informed consent was collected
from all survey respondents and interviewees.
Analysis methods
Principal component analysis (PCA) was run on a group
of variables in the household survey including household
ownership of 10 durable assets and housing characteris-
tics, such as water source, lighting source, fuel source,
a n dp r e s e n c eo ft o i l e t[ 6 ] .P C Aw a sr u ns e p a r a t e l yf o r
each of the 10 provinces, in order to ensure that mea-
s u r e so fw e a l t hw e r ea ss p e c i f i ca sp o s s i b l et ot h el o c a l
context and with sufficient sample size. To increase the
sample size for the PCA, households from additional
facilities participating in the health financing pilot study
surveyed during the follow-up evaluation that were ran-
domized to free services (n = 9) or to serve as control
facilities (n = 8) were included in the PCA for each pro-
vince. (Household survey sample sizes were initially
based on comparing study groups to one another and it
was not possible to increase the number of households
surveyed in user fee areas alone at follow-up.) The total
number of households surveyed per province ranged
from 124 to 373 (average = 242 households per pro-
vince). The resulting household wealth scores from the
follow-up survey were then used to divide households
into five equal groups per province.
The following measures of accuracy and prediction
errors, which are commonly used for assessing poverty
prediction tools or performance of actual targeting
[3,4,29], were used to evaluate targeting effectiveness:
- Under-coverage: actual poor wrongly classified as
non-poor, as a proportion of the poor (equivalent to
a false negative)
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poor, as a proportion of all beneficiaries (equivalent
to a false positive)
- Progressivity ratio: proportion of total benefits
going to poor as a proportion of population com-
prised by poor (a value of 1 indicates neutral target-
ing) [3], i.e.
(# / # )
(# / #
poorbeneficiaries totalbeneficiaries
poorhouseholds t totalhouseholds)
Alternative measures of wealth using PCA were cre-
ated that also included variables on food insecurity and
ah o u s e h o l d ’s measure of their perceived wealth, in
addition to assets. Self reported (perceived) wealth was
also used as a stand-alone proxy indicator for household
wealth. In addition, PCA was run on all provinces com-
bined (“national” PCA) and on just households in the
user fee catchment areas, separately by province, to test
the sensitivity of targeting performance to different spe-
cifications of the wealth index. The resulting wealth
indices were fairly normally distributed within each pro-
vince without major truncation or clustering of values.
Finally, the household survey data were used to ana-
lyze the effects of the waiver card on utilization of cura-
tive care services at the pilot facility, using the primary
outcome of whether an individual household member
sought care if ill in the past 30 days. Previous research
has shown that participation in voluntary programs to
reduce the cost of health care use, such as health insur-
ance, may be related to underlying propensity to use
health care [30-32], and this potential endogeneity may
also apply to receiving a waiver card and needs to be
taken into account [33]. Since selection into the waiver
card scheme was not random, it could potentially be
correlated with unobservable factors that affect indivi-
duals’ or households’ u s eo fc a r e( f o re x a m p l e ,p r o p e n -
sity to value health or use care) and could therefore bias
the results if not taken into consideration. Potential
endogeneity and selection effects of the waiver card
were assessed through several means. First, the Wu ver-
sion of the Hausman test [34,35] assessed whether
unobservable variables related to waiver card receipt
were correlated with unobservable variables related to
seeking care, by including the predicted values from a
probit equation of card ownership in a probit model for
the care-seeking equation, along with the potentially
endogenous card variable. Next, we used a bivariate pro-
bit analysis, an appropriate analysis when a binary out-
come (care-seeking, in this case) is determined by a
binary variable of interest (receipt of waiver card) that is
likely jointly determined with the outcome, necessitating
a sort of simultaneous equations treatment [36,37]. We
assessed whether rho, the correlation between the error
terms of the two equations–one for care-seeking and
one for waiver card–were significant, which indicates
potential endogeneity that should be addressed in order
to make valid inferences about causal effects.
There was little evidence of endogeneity of the waiver
card and care-seeking (results available from authors
upon request). Since unnecessary correction for endo-
geneity results in loss of efficiency, simple probit ana-
lyses are preferred in the absence of strong evidence of
endogeneity. Therefore, a simple probit model was used
for the care-seeking outcome, as follows:
Care-seeking* = X’ b1 + δ Card + ε
where Care-seeking* represents propensity to seek
care; and X represents a vector of exogenous covariates
that predict care-seeking, including: household demo-
graphic characteristics (the proportion of women of
reproductive age in the household; proportion of chil-
dren under five in the household; family size of 10 or
more); household health (proportion of household mem-
bers sick in the previous 30 days); socioeconomic factors
(primary school or greater for the head of household;
continuous wealth score; 1/wealth score
2); women’s
care-seeking autonomy; province; type of nearest facility
(hospital vs. clinic); average travel time to the facility;
and individual characteristics, including age (under-five
versus five and older), sex, and severity of illness (severe
versus not severe). Women’s care-seeking autonomy was
measured by asking the household survey respondent
(usually a woman) about which household member has
the final say in deciding whether a sick child should be
taken for care; responses of “mother/caretaker” were
coded as one (23.3% of the sample), and other responses
(e.g., father, mother-in-law, other) were coded as zero.
Card is a binary variable that represents whether the
household received a waiver card, and ε is a normally
distributed error term.
Care-seeking models were also run for the poorest
40% of the sample, defined using the asset index wealth
score, to assess the ultimate outcome of interest: the
effect of the waiver card on use of care by the poor. All
statistical analyses were adjusted for stratification by
province and clustering by village using the survey com-
mands in Stata Version 10.0.
Results
Waiver card implementation
Interviews with facility staff and community members of
the user fee committee revealed that the household enu-
meration and waiver card distribution process was one
of the more time-consuming and challenging aspects of
t h eu s e rf e ep i l o t .T h eh o u s e hold enumeration process
took two to three months, on average, and the waiver
card distribution process another two to three months.
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according to the pilot design, but slightly more than
one-third stored cards at the facility for household
members to retrieve. Facilities implemented the waiver
card system in many different ways, drawing upon exist-
ing resources at the facility and within the community
to identify households and distribute waiver cards, for
example, using community health workers (CHWs) and
local schoolteachers in some areas to enumerate house-
holds and identify eligible households.
Facility records indicated that cards were distributed to
on average 12.2% of catchment area households (median
= 10.8%; range = 4.1% to 23.4%). Typically, village repre-
sentatives, including village council (shura)m e m b e r s ,
elders, the Mullah/Imam, as well as in some cases
CHWs and other facility staff, were involved in nominat-
ing households for waiver cards, and the community
members of the user fee committee usually had the final
say about who received cards. At most facilities, 100% of
identified households received a waiver card, but at four
facilities, the user fee committee more carefully verified
their eligibility (either with a door-to-door household
survey or through less formal means), which resulted in
only two-thirds to three-quarters of the initially
nominated households actually receiving cards, as the
remaining households were not considered to be very
poor. Self-targeting still occurred to some extent, with
patients without waiver cards presenting at facilities but
still receiving services for free, as they claimed to be poor
(and withstood initial questioning from the facility regis-
trar). However, in many cases the registrar did not com-
plete the screening questionnaire to determine waiver
card eligibility and simply waived the fee if he/she
believed that the patient truly could not pay. It was not
always clear why the registrar did not complete the train-
ing form; at some facilities it appeared that insufficient
attention to customizing the screening questionnaire to
the local context meant that the register did not believe it
accurately differentiated very poor households.
Awareness of waiver card scheme and fees
Awareness of the fees at user fee facilities was high: only
1.3% of respondents in user fee catchment areas erro-
neously believed that services were free. Among those
aware of fees, 94.7% knew that the facility charged a
consultation fee, and 90.0% were aware of the charge for
drugs. Regarding exempt services, there was higher
awareness that immunization services were free (89.6%)
compared to awareness of free reproductive health ser-
vices (62.6% for ANC, 51.4% for family planning, and
40.5% for deliveries). Almost half the household survey
respondents (48.6%) believed that the poor were exempt
from paying fees, and 40.9% were aware that widows
could receive services for free. However, nearly 40% of
respondents (39.8%) were not aware that some patients
were exempt from paying fees.
In the immediate catchment areas of user fee facilities,
40.3% of those who knew the facility charged fees were
aware of the waiver card system. Those households in
the catchment areas of primary care user fee facilities
were more likely to have heard of the waiver card sys-
tem (46.6%) compared to households in the catchment
areas of user fee hospitals (17.9%), p = 0.001. Overall,
166 out of 1,148 households surveyed (14.5%) in catch-
ment areas of user fee facilities with waiver card systems
reported receiving a waiver card. A slightly greater pro-
portion of households near primary care user fee facil-
ities received cards (15.4%) compared to those near
hospitals (11.2%), but this difference was not statistically
significant.
Targeting effectiveness
Households receiving waiver cards had lower average
wealth scores from PCA than those without cards: -0.55
versus -0.09, p < 0.001, equivalent to about one-quarter
of a standard deviation difference between the two
groups (Table 1). They also had lower self-rated wealth
scores and higher average food insecurity scores. Per-
haps a more directly relevant measure for waiver card
targeting is a household’s ability to afford fees. Only
30.3% of respondents whose household had received a
waiver card reported being able to pay fees with little to
no difficulty, compared to 60.5% of those without a
card, p < 0.001 (Table 1). Among those with waiver
cards, 57.6% reported being unable to pay fees at all,
versus only 17.9% of those without a card, p < 0.001.
In addition to differences in various measures of
wealth and vulnerability, and differences in facility utili-
zation (discussed below), a major difference between
cardholders and non-cardholders pertained to “women’s
care-seeking autonomy”. In cardholding households, the
mother/caretaker was more than twice as likely to have
t h ef i n a ls a ya b o u tt a k i n gas i c kc h i l df o rc a r et h a ni n
non-cardholding households (42.8% vs. 20.1%, p <
0.001). Other than these specific differences, there were
no significant differences between cardholders and non-
cardholders in other characteristics, including demo-
graphics, illness rates, education, ability to borrow
money, or other factors (Table 1).
There was extremely high correlation between wealth
variables created with different combinations of assets
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient ranged from 0.97 to
0.99). As shown in Figure 1, 18.7% of the poorest quin-
tile, and 18.4% of the second-poorest quintile received
waiver cards, compared with an average of 11.3% in
wealthier quintiles, when quintiles were created at the
provincial level from wealth scores using the assets and
housing characteristics only. Measures of leakage and
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first, considering as poor those with the lowest 20% of
wealth scores; and second, those with the lowest 40%.
Leakage was higher when the stricter cut-off of the low-
est quintile was used to define the poor (65.9%), com-
pared to a cut-off of the bottom two quintiles (42.1%) -
see Table 2.
Under-coverage was similarly very high under both sce-
narios: 81.2% and 81.4%, respectively (see Table 2). Pre-
vious studies have found that the degree of under-coverage
tends not to be sensitive to the poverty line cut-off, but
that leakage rises dramatically with lower (more strict) pov-
erty lines [2]. Results were similar using wealth quintiles
created from scores using self-rated wealth and/or food
security measures, in addition to assets (results not shown).
However, leakage was considerably higher (54.9%) and
under-coverage somewhat higher (85.0%) when consider-
ing the bottom 40% as poor and when quintiles were cre-
ated at the provincial level from PCA on households only
near user fee facilities. However, it is doubtful that provin-
cial-level wealth scores from only the user fee areas are
valid, as the sample size was only 50 or 100 in most pro-
vinces, too small for PCA to yield valid results [38]. Wealth
quintiles created on all provinces combined indicated
worse coverage and leakage results, as might be expected,
since these do not reflect measures of local wealth (results
Table 1 Characteristics of cardholders versus non-cardholders
Card p-value, difference
No Yes
n = 982 n = 166
Any facility delivery among HH members in last 6 mos. 0.109 [0.088, 0.134] 0.212 [0.150, 0.291] p = 0.001
Care sought if HH member ill in last 30 days
¥ 0.8719 [0.842, 0.897] 0.9569 [0.939, 0.970] p < 0.001
Wealth status
Average wealth score -0.093 [-0.368, 0.182] -0.547 [-0.809, -0.284] p < 0.001
% in bottom 40% 0.434 [0.364, 0.507] 0.579 [0.494, 0.660] p = 0.001
Average self-rated wealth score (1-5)* 2.129 [2.046, 2.213] 1.867 [1.735, 2.000] p < 0.001
Average food insecurity score (1-5)** 1.892 [1.784, 2.000] 2.307 [2.115, 2.499] p = 0.002
Can afford fees with little to no difficulty 0.605 [0.561, 0.647] 0.303 [0.232, 0.385] p < 0.001
Mother/caretaker primary decision-maker in taking sick child for care 0.201 [0.171, 0.234] 0.428 [0.346, 0.514] p < 0.001
Probability that HH member sick in last 30 days 0.197 [0.188, 0.208] 0.221 [0.194, 0.250] NS
Average family size 7.05 [6.86, 7.25] 7.05 [6.787, 7.322] NS
# kids <5 1.64 [1.58, 1.71] 1.60 [1.47, 1.74] NS
# Women repro. age 1.42 [1.37, 1.47] 1.45 [1.35, 1.56] NS
Female-headed household 0.032 [0.021, 0.048] 0.042 [0.017, 0.100] NS
Any education, head of household 0.310 [0.267, 0.354] 0.259 [0.202, 0.316] NS
Proportion of kids 5-18 in school 0.390 [0.020, 0.350] 0.398 [0.035, 0.328] NS
Any participation in community forums 0.039 [0.026, 0.051] 0.030 [0.004, 0.056] NS
Able to borrow from family or friends 0.755 [0.721,0.786] 0.758 [0.659,0.835] NS
Unable to access any credit 0.080 [0.060,0.105] 0.085 [0.040,0.170] NS
Average travel time, minutes 66.5 [51.2, 81.8] 65.8 [44.1, 87.5] NS
Note: Average wealth score and % in bottom 40% based on PCA-derived basic asset index for each province, including free services and control facilities.
Standard errors account for survey design. NS=Not Significant.
¥ This outcome is measured at the individual household member level (n = 1,566 household members sick in last 30 days; 1,311 non-cardholders and 255
cardholders). All other variables measured at the household level.
* 1 = poorest; 5 = wealthiest.
** 1 = low food insecurity; 5 = high food insecurity.
Figure 1 Waiver card ownership, by wealth quintile.N o t e :
Wealth scores created from PCA on basic asset index and housing
characteristics, for each province separately. 1 = Poorest; 5 = Least
Poor.
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on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) was used to assess
these measures, under-coverage rates were similar but leak-
age declined to 19.3% when using a cut-off of a “1” or “2”
rating as poor, as 70.8% of households rated their wealth
status in the first two “quintiles”, making it more likely that
a card beneficiary would be “poor” (see Table 2). Among
the 38 female-headed households (3.3% of all households)
in user fee catchment area survey sample, only 7 (18.4%)
received a waiver card, indicating ineffective targeting of
female-headed households.
The progressivity ratio, defined as the proportion of
benefits going to the poor compared to the proportion
of the population comprised by the poor [3], was
greater than one using PCA-determined poverty cut-
off levels, as well as using the more subjective measure
of self-rated wealth. The poor were 14-34% more likely
to receive a waiver card compared to the non-poor
(see Table 2). Results from the alternative PCA specifi-
cations were similar except for ratios calculated with
wealth quintiles created from PCA on all provinces
combined or from only the user fee facilities, which
indicated more neutral targeting (results not shown).
Perceptions of waiver card targeting among facility staff
and community leaders
Between two and seven community members of the user
fee committee participated in the focus group interviews.
In general, interviewed facility staff and community lea-
ders reported that the waiver card system was implemen-
ted effectively, with little leakage but some under-
coverage due to high rates of poverty in catchment areas.
Facility staff and community leaders reported that in
most areas, communities–involving some combination of
village council (i.e. shura) members and elders, and, in
some cases, CHWs and the Mullah/Imam as well–were
authorized to draw up a list of very poor and female-
headed households. The list was then typically approved
by user fee committee members (both facility staff and
community members) after verifying the economic status
of the households through their collective knowledge
and, in some cases, visits to the homes of potential card
beneficiaries. Despite initial problems at some facilities,
especially those with no previous fees, related to many
people wanting cards and claiming to be poor, the pro-
cess ultimately proceeded smoothly at most facilities and
was transparent and effective in targeting deserving
Table 2 Number and percent of households, by wealth quintile and card ownership, and selected measures of
targeting performance
Wealth quintiles from PCA Self-rated wealth status
Card ownership Card ownership
Quintile No Yes Total Rating No Yes Total
1 N 242 56 298 1 N 233 56 289
% 81.2 18.8 100.0 % 80.6 19.4 100.0
2 N 173 39 212 2 N 445 78 523
% 81.6 18.4 100.0 % 85.1 14.9 100.0
3 N 169 31 200 3 N 253 30 283
% 84.5 15.5 100.0 % 89.4 10.6 100.0
4 N 199 18 217 4 N 43 2 45
% 91.7 8.3 100.0 % 95.6 4.4 100.0
5 N 173 20 193 5 N 7 0 7
% 89.6 10.4 100.0 % 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total N 956 164 1,120 Total N 981 166 1,147
% 85.4 14.6 100.0 % 85.5 14.5 100.0
Leakage - 20% poor 65.9% Leakage - “1” = poor 66.2%
Leakage - 40% poor 42.1% Leakage - “1” or “2” = poor 19.3%
Under-coverage - 20% poor 81.2% Under-coverage - “1” = poor 80.6%
Under-coverage - 40% poor 81.4% Under-coverage - “1” or “2” = poor 83.5%
Progressivity ratio 20% poor
1 1.28 Progressivity ratio “1” = poor
1 1.34
Progressivity ratio 40% poor
1 1.27 Progressivity ratio “1” or “2” = poor
1 1.14
1 Progressivity ratio = proportion of total benefits going to poor/proportion of population comprised by poor (Coady et al. 2002). (A value of 1 indicates neutral
targeting.)
Note: Wealth quintiles created from PCA on basic asset index for each province separately (including free services and control facilities). For quintile scores and
self-rated wealth ratings, 1 = lowest; 5 = highest.
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mentioned that in order to be more transparent, either a
survey had to be conducted of all households in the
catchment area, or the Mullah/Imam should be more
involved in the process, as he generally knows the eco-
nomic status of his followers well. A few facility staff
raised the issue of needing continual or updated assess-
ments, for example to identify people moving into the
area who might need a waiver card, or to give cards to/
take cards from households whose economic status had
changed since the last assessment. In several cases, com-
munity leaders remarked that the number of cards
should be increased, as not all very poor households
received a card due to limited numbers. Two of the 13
community leaders interviewed mentioned that they felt
“family and tribal” pressure to distribute cards to those
they knew, although both these leaders mentioned they
resisted this pressure successfully, as one leader noted
below.
I: Was [the waiver card nomination and distribution]
process fair and just?
R: Yes, it was very just.
I: Did you face any problem in this process?
R: Yes. I went to a house and there a person who
told me that her sister is poor and should be given
an exemption card. When I went there, his sister
was neither poor nor a widow. He first was insisting
and even was ready to fight but later I tried and
convinced him and then he agreed.
- Community leader, catchment area village of user fee
District Hospital
One of the community representatives on the user fee
committee at this same facility remarked that the target-
ing was generally good, although not perfect, alluding to
the difficulty of complete transparency in local alloca-
tion systems:
R: We are representatives of people and we always
have been in favor of justice during the distribution
of the cards. Those who are tasked this work, they
might have been able to do their work around 70%
and it is possible that there would be some people
who are not poor and have acquaintance with the
representatives but have received the cards. And also
there would be some people who are really poor but
have not received the exemption cards. We as elders
of the community have tried to provide the cards to
those who really deserve it. But it is not possible to
implement any project in the villages with 100%
justice.
- Community leader involved in user fee committee,
catchment area village of user fee District Hospital
Households were asked an open-ended question as part
of the household survey about their general perceptions
of the waiver card system. Among those respondents
who were aware about the waiver card system (292 of
982 non-cardholders (29.7%) and 100% of 166 card-
holders), 68.5% of non-cardholders and 84.3% of card-
holders made generally positive comments, including
statements like “it has good effects on people”, “it makes
going to the clinic easy”, and “it helps poor people solve
their problems”. Twenty-eight percent of non-card-
holders and 8% of cardholder st h o u g h tt h a tm o r ec a r d s
overall were needed, making statements such as, “addi-
tional households need cards”,a n d“cards should be
given to all households” or noting that they themselves
wanted a card. Only 4.8% of non-cardholders and 2.4%
of cardholders made statements about the unjustness of
the targeting system, such as “cards are given to those
who know one another”, “they don’t give cards to poor
people,” or “there should be a re-assessment to identify
poor households”.
Effects of waiver cards on utilization of curative care
services
Most cardholders reported that their household used
both more curative (85.5%) and more preventive care
(83.7%) as a result of the waiver card, although 11.3%
and 13.2% reported using less curative and preventive
care, respectively, as a result of the card, and 3.1%
reported no change. Overall, 95.7% of sick individuals
from cardholding households compared with 87.2% of
sick members of non-cardholding households sought
care when ill in the last 30 days with an illness they
deemed worthy of seeking care, p < 0.001. Adjusted for
other factors, the probit model indicated that individuals
from cardholding households were 3.1 percentage points
more likely to seek care than sick members of house-
holds without cards, p = 0.016 (Table 3). In addition to
geographic location, age less than five years and pre-
sence of a severe (vs. mild or moderate) illness, were
significantly related to seeking care, as was women’s
care-seeking autonomy (Table 3). Education of the head
of household also had a positive effect on care-seeking,
although this was only marginally statistically significant
(p = 0.066). Probit analysis of the poorest 40% of the
sample indicated that the waiver card had an even
stronger effect, increasing care-seeking by 6.2 percentage
points, p < 0.001 (results not shown).
Despite elimination of the financial barrier at the pilot
facility for cardholders, there still remained financial and
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with and without waiver cards. Overall, more than half
(58.0%) of household respondents reported facing a pro-
blem in getting health care that they or someone in the
household needed in the past year. This was slightly
higher among cardholders (64.5%) compared to non-
cardholders (57.1%), though the difference was not sta-
tistically significant. The largest reported barrier was
lack of money for treatment, reported by nearly half
(49.5%) of respondents (see Table 4). Interestingly,
slightly more cardholders (53.6%) than non-cardholders
(48.8%) reported that lack of money for treatment was
one of the barriers to accessing care they faced in the
last year, though this difference was not statistically sig-
nificant. Lack of transportation (24.0% overall) and lack
of money for transport (20.6% overall) were other
important barriers. The only statistically significant dif-
ference in reported barriers to accessing needed care by
cardholders versus non-cardholders was the availability
of someone to take a child for treatment: 28.9% versus
14.8%, p < 0.001.
Discussion
From the perspective of community leaders and facility
staff, the waiver card system was able to be implemen-
ted successfully in Afghanistan in 26 of 27 facilities
across 10 provinces piloting the user fee system under
the health financing pilot study. Given the flexibility
built into the pilot design, as well as substantial local
heterogeneity in local community structures in Afghani-
stan [39], the waiver card system implementation pro-
cess was very context-specific and heterogeneous.
Waiver cards were distributed to households within one
year of pilot implementation an d ,i nm o s tc a s e s ,w i t h i n
s i xm o n t h s ,ar e l a t i v e l ys h o r tt i m ef r a m eg i v e nt h el a c k
of additional human and financial resources devoted to
the waiver card scheme. However, despite training and
continued technical assistance for implementation, this
lack of dedicated staff and resources made the waiver
card system one of the more time-consuming and chal-
lenging aspects of the user fee pilot. Households in the
catchment areas of pilot facilities had high awareness of
fees, but relatively low awareness of the waiver card sys-
tem (40.3%) and of exempt preventive/promotive ser-
vices, indicating incomplete community mobilization
and information dissemination.
Facility staff and community leaders involved in the
user fee and waiver card systems reported that the tar-
geting process was fair, transparent, and relatively accu-
rate. However, they noted in many cases that more
cards were needed as there were not enough to cover
the large numbers of poor households in the area, and
some mentioned occasional occurrences of leakage to
wealthier households. It is important to keep in mind
the perspectives and potential biases of the facility staff
and village leaders, who were directly involved in the
waiver card process and therefore have reason to pre-
sent themselves and the process as fair and effective.
Although there was limited information available to cap-
ture household’s viewpoints, open-ended survey ques-
tions of card-holding and non-cardholding households
indicated that they had mostly favorable perceptions of
the targeting process among those aware of the waiver
card system.
Household survey results using wealth scores derived
from PCA on household assets revealed that although
the card distribution was overall pro-poor, in the sense
that the poor had a higher probably of receiving a card,
there was significant under-coverage and leakage, a
Table 3 Marginal effects from probit model of care-
seeking
Probit Model
CARE-
SEEKING
dy/dx SE p-value
Card 0.0306 0.0127 0.016 ++
Prop. women repro. Age 0.1426 0.0811 0.079 +
Prop. kids <5 -0.0061 0.0485 0.900
Family size >9 members -0.0018 0.0140 0.896
Women’s careseeking autonomy 0.0245 0.0108 0.023 ++
Prop. sick HH members last 30 days -0.0689 0.0311 0.027–
Female-headed household 0.0190 0.0270 0.482
More than 6 years education, head of HH 0.0285 0.0155 0.066 +
Wealth 0.0039 0.0044 0.373
1/Wealth
2 0.0002 0.0001 0.041 ++
Province (reference = Kapisa)
Parwan 0.0388 0.0161 0.016 ++
Wardak 0.0385 0.0138 0.005 +++
Samangan 0.0270 0.0184 0.143
Balkh -0.0485 0.0350 0.165
Badghis 0.0127 0.0216 0.557
Farah -0.0068 0.0312 0.827
Nimruz 0.0115 0.0235 0.624
Sari-Pol 0.0672 0.0198 0.001 +++
Panjshir 0.0614 0.0184 0.001 +++
In catchment of hospital (ref. = catchment
clinic)
0.0009 0.0136 0.947
Avg. travel time, hours -0.0152 0.0083 0.067 -
Age < 5 years 0.0297 0.0127 0.020 ++
Severe illness (vs. mild/moderate) 0.0332 0.0133 0.012 ++
Female -0.0094 0.0103 0.363
N 1486
+ = p < 0.10; ++ = p < 0.05; +++ = p < 0.01; same meaning for negatively
associated variables.
Standard errors adjusted for cluster sampling.
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program for the poor in Indonesia [3,33], where leakage
and under-coverage were estimated to be 25.5% and
69.7%, respectively, considering the poorest 40% as
“poor” (Authors’ own calculations based on [33]). Even
in Cambodia, which has largely been considered an
example of successful targeting, one evaluation four
years after the initial targeting found under-coverage
and leakage to be about 40% each, reflecting imperfec-
tions in targeting and the d y n a m i cn a t u r eo fp o v e r t y
over time [40]. The goal is not necessarily perfect target-
ing, and efforts to increase the precision of targeting can
have large costs as well, not only in terms of actual
costs to more accurately target only the poor, but in
terms of political economy as well, as broad-based sup-
port for the program across income groups may collapse
and undermine the benefit, known as the “paradox of
targeting” [8,30,41]. Part of the large under-coverage in
Afghanistan may have been due to the suggested 15%
eligibility for waiver cards. Although facilities and com-
munities were instructed that this was flexible, they may
have used this guide too stringently, leading to under-
coverage in poorer areas. Interviews from some facilities
also revealed that facility staff allowed community lea-
ders to nominate households in each village, but capped
the proportion of households in each village to be uni-
form across the catchment area, even though some vil-
lages are poorer than others, further exacerbating
under-coverage problems. It was not clear why targeting
of female-headed households did not seem to be
effective.
A major strength of the waiver card system was pre-
identification of households in their communities. Cer-
tain health equity funds operating in Cambodia have
shown that eligibility screening and identification of
poor patients after they reach the hospital results in low
awareness of the fund among the target population and
continued financial barriers to access among those una-
ware [42,43]. However, compared to other pre-
identification schemes documented in the literature, this
pre-identification process was much less thorough and
involved, and only four of the 25 facilities expended
efforts to systematically verify the eligibility of nomi-
nated households through household visits. Among
health equity funds in Cambodia that use pre-identifica-
tion, although their exact processes for determining
beneficiaries varies, nearly all followed up on initial lists
of households gathered from government census and
from village leaders to systematically evaluate nominated
households in each village, and used dedicated staff and
explicit scoring of proxy means tests (e.g., demographic
and housing characteristics, education of family mem-
bers, and ownership of various household assets as well
as other factors) [44]. Researchers working on evaluating
health equity funds in Cambodia have recommended
t h a tp r e - i d e n t i f i c a t i o nn o tb ed o n eo n l yo n c eb u t
through a series of steps to evaluate the eligibility of
households [44].
It appears that possession of a waiver card led to
increased use of services among households, and this
effect was even more pronounced for the poor, increas-
ing their care-seeking by 6.2 percentage points. Addi-
tional analyses (not shown) indicated that it is likely
that the card also led to increased use of delivery ser-
vices at the facility, although it was not possible to tease
apart this effect with accuracy due to relatively low use
of delivery services overall and the limited sample size
of the household survey. Even though increases in deliv-
ery use associated with the card were modest, at just
over 3 percentage points, according to the simple probit
model, this represents a 33% increase in delivery use
compared to non-cardholders, an important gain in a
country with high maternal mortality ratios and very
low rates of institutional delivery [45,46]. The findings
are also relevant for other demand-side interventions
and demonstrate the potential for mechanisms such as
conditional cash transfers or other demand-side subsi-
dies to increase use of underutilized services (e.g.,
Table 4 Reported barriers to accessing care in the last year, by card status (%, [95% CI])
Card
No Yes Total
No money for treatment 48.8% [43.6%, 54.0%] 53.6% [44.0%, 63.0%] 49.5% [44.8%, 54.1%]
No transport available 24.0% [19.9%, 28.7%] 24.1% [18.2%, 31.2%] 24.0% [20.1%, 28.4%]
No money for transport 19.9% [15.7%,24.9%] 24.7% [18.3%, 32.4%] 20.6% [16.5%, 25.3%]
No one to take child for care 14.8% [12.2%, 17.8%] 28.9%*** [21.8%, 37.2%] 16.8% [14.4%, 19.5%]
No drugs available 13.8% [10.8%, 17.6%] 15.7% [9.5%, 24.7%] 14.1% [11.0%, 17.9%]
Health center too far 12.7% [8.8%, 18.1%] 9.6% [5.3%, 16.8%] 12.3% [8.6%, 17.2%]
No one to accompany female 8.0% [5.6%, 11.3%] 6.0% [3.0%, 11.6%] 7.8% [5.6%, 10.7%]
Inconvenient hours of provider 4.2% [2.7%, 6.3%] 3.0% [1.5%, 6.0%] 4.0% [2.7%, 6.0%]
Source: Household survey. Standard errors adjusted for cluster sampling.
*** p < 0.001.
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Page 11 of 15delivery, immunizations), as these interventions can be
even more comprehensive in addressing financial bar-
riers to care and, in some cases, nonfinancial barriers
such as transportation availability.
Cardholders also reported greater care-seeking auton-
omy among women. While this may reflect selection
bias related to these households’ propensity to value
health and use care, it is also possible that ownership of
the waiver card increased the autonomy of women in
these households, as they no longer needed to consider
the cost implications of seeking care as seriously and
did not need to rely as much on the male household
authority figures to give them money for user fees. Pre-
vious studies from low- and middle-income countries
have found that women typically have the responsibility
for taking sick children for care, but that men tend to
control cash in the household [47]. However, it is not
possible to determine with certainty whether waiver
cards were given to households with greater women’s
care-seeking autonomy, or whether they actually helped
increase care-seeking autonomy among receiving house-
holds, as this variable was not measured at baseline.
The increase in service use from the waiver card is
consistent with findings from Cambodia, where equity
certificates for pre-identified households led to hospitali-
zation rates among beneficiaries that were one-and-a-
half to eight times greater than non-health-equity-fund
recipients, and with findings from an evaluation of the
Health Care Fund for the Poor in Vietnam [48-51].
Similar results were found in Indonesia, following distri-
bution of health cards to vulnerable households to help
counteract the Indonesian economic crisis [33].
Limitations
Several important limitations apply to the results from
this study. First, it is important to keep in mind that
comparisons for the purposes of evaluating targeting
accuracy were done without a strong measure of house-
hold consumption for comparison. Although they have
been shown to be valid indicators of underlying wealth,
proxy scores from asset indices created from PCA are
just that: proxies. They may better reflect accumulated
wealth than more liquid types of cash or assets that can
be used to pay facility fees. The PCA methodology is
most useful for identifying relative wealth, and not abso-
lute wealth, such as wealth in relation to a poverty line
created from household consumption. However, since
the PCA was run separately for each province, the
wealth scores should reflect local measures of relative
wealth that are also important in targeting. Future
research on targeting in Afghanistan should consider
using both relative and absolute measures of wealth, as
well as capturing more in-depth perspectives on wealth
and targeting from community members.
In addition, although we did not find strong evidence
of endogeneity of the card with the care-seeking out-
come, we cannot rule out this possibility and determine
definitively whether the card led to increased use of ser-
vices. Evidence points in that direction, but without
baseline data from the same households, it is difficult to
conclude with certainty that the waiver card led to
increased care-seeking.
Lessons learned and policy implications
If Afghanistan is to re-implement the waiver card sys-
tem in the future, for example as a formal mechanism
to increase access by the poor to services at higher-level
hospitals, which still charge fees, what lessons can it
learn from this pilot experience and those of its neigh-
bors? Several targeting-related and operational changes
should be considered.
Targeting considerations
First, Afghanistan should build upon the success it has
had in implementing a community-nominated waiver
card system that was perceived by community leaders
and facility staff as relatively transparent and fair. This
is an important accomplishment in a post-conflict set-
ting, where trust in institutions, including at the com-
munity level, related to publicly financed services, has
been worn down from years of fighting and ethnic rival-
ries. Involvement of community members in beneficiary
nomination provides a way to increase community parti-
cipation in health and contributes to rebuilding trust in
institutions at the community level, a particularly impor-
tant benefit in post-conflict settings [19].
As suggested in several interviews with facility staff
and community leaders, a new waiver card system
should consider more active involvement in nominating
households by Mullahs/Imams,w h oa r ew i d e l y
respected in communities and tend to have good knowl-
edge of individual household conditions. Religious lea-
ders, viewed as honest and trustworthy, have
successfully been involved in community-based targeting
in Cambodia, and researchers have pointed to the com-
munity-based management of targeting, including high
involvement of the pagodas and their trusted volunteers
and monks, as one of the important keys to success of
the equity fund [19].
Another contributing factor to the successful commu-
nity-based targeting used in several Cambodian health
equity funds is the presence of clearly defined eligibility
criteria [19], which were much looser in Afghanistan,
given the wide geographic variability of the pilots and
the absence of cash income in many areas. Although the
individual NGOs implementing health equity funds in
different regions of Cambodia ended up using different
proxy means targeting criteria from one another,
researchers have identified the relatively uniform social
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tor in the success of health equity funds [52]. Afghani-
stan is much more diverse geographically, culturally,
and socioeconomically than Cambodia. This indicates
that a more diverse targeting strategy, including geo-
graphic targeting for high-poverty districts where the
cost of individual household targeting does not make
sense, may be warranted. This approach has been suc-
cessfully implemented in Vietnam, which uses a mix of
individual characteristic and geographical targeting to
identify beneficiaries for its Health Care Fund for the
Poor [51].
Despite the geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural
diversity in Afghanistan, which may preclude the devel-
opment of a uniform national set of targeting criteria,
specific verifiable criteria should still be developed for
future targeting schemes in Afghanistan. This will make
eligibility easier to verify and the process more transpar-
ent. Similar to what is currently being piloted in Lao
PDR, the process could begin in a similar manner as
before with a broader list of poor households provided
by village leaders, using pre-identification criteria, and
then screened by dedicated staff or trained volunteers
using the objective criteria [20]. The objective criteria
could–and certainly would be expected to–vary by geo-
graphic location. Close coordination with existing
sources of data on poverty and vulnerability in Afghani-
stan, such as the biennial
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA)
survey, could prove extremely valuable for implemen-
tation of successful geographic targeting and develop-
ment of localized objectively verifiable proxy indicators
for community targeting. It would also be worthwhile
to pursue collaboration with other sectors, such as
agriculture, livelihoods, education, and others, to
examine the feasibility of developing a common waiver
card or targeting scheme across multiple sectors where
targeting can be an important aspect of service
delivery.
Operational implications
The waiver card scheme was positively viewed by both
community leaders and facility staff, despite the lack of
reimbursement to facilities for the foregone user fee rev-
enues. This reimbursement of foregone user fee reven-
ues is one factor that has been cited as key to the
success of the health equity funds in Cambodia
[42,49,53] as well as for health financing programs for
the poor in Vietnam [48]. Even if fee revenues do not
constitute a significant portion of staff income in Afgha-
nistan, as they do in Cambodia and Vietnam [52], a
waiver card scheme, especially at the hospital level
where inpatient stays represent larger sources of rev-
enue, should consider directly reimbursing facilities for
use of care by cardholding patients.
Additionally, if waiver cards are used for hospital fees,
it will be important to reimburse for indirect costs as
well, including transportation, food, and other costs
associated with seeking care [51]. This research indi-
cated that financial access still appears to be a barrier,
even among cardholding households, and waiver card
programs should be expanded to cover additional costs
of seeking care. It is noteworthy that there was no evi-
dence of “unofficial” charges to waiver cardholders at
user fee facilities, but the reported financial barriers may
have been due to other costs related to care-seeking,
such as transportation fees, food, lodging, or seeking
care at other providers (e.g., private providers). How-
ever, even more generous reimbursement packages may
not be sufficient to remove all financial barriers to seek-
ing care, as research in Cambodia found that health
equity fund beneficiaries still were unable to afford the
upfront costs of seeking hospital care [43].
Finally, it is critical to continue to invest in monitor-
ing and evaluation efforts if a revised form of waiver
cards is implemented in the future. This research contri-
butes to the relatively scarce literature on community-
identified targeting, demonstrating that it is possible to
implement a pro-poor and favorably viewed waiver card
scheme within a relatively short time and with limited
additional support. However, targeting did not perform
well according to PCA-derived relative wealth scores,
indicating that these measures may not be the most
appropriate for capturing disposable income and/or that
community leaders are taking other important factors
into consideration when nominating households.
The post-conflict setting in which the scheme was car-
ried out provides encouraging evidence that beneficial
health services delivery strategies can also contribute to
community participation and rebuilding of institutions
at the local level. These results lend support to the
notion that waiver cards can increase utilization of care,
even for services that have multiple barriers to use.
Afghanistan abolished user fees for primary care in
2008, citing the results of the larger pilot study in which
the waiver card scheme took place, but barriers to
access remain. Further research should examine the
effects of demand-side financing interventions to
improve utilization of important public health services
in Afghanistan, as well as a waiver card scheme for
costly hospital-level services to prevent catastrophic
expenditures and encourage use, building on the initial
results from this study.
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